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Introduction 
Anyone who spends a long time in a job builds up a  
fund of stories, some of which are true. Those of us 
involved with information security are no exception, and 
in this article, I want to share some of the events I have 
come across. I can vouch for their truth, but for obvious 
reasons I will not identify the names or nationalities 
of any of the organisations that were involved. What 
matters is not that the organisation was the victim, but 
the lessons that can be learned. Why are these failures 
relevant today? To paraphrase George Santayana, ‘Those 
who cannot remember security failures are condemned to 
repeat them.’1 
Poor product security – can we rely on what 
the vendors tell us? 
The first two examples concern security features that 
appeared at first glance to be very effective, but which 
in practice were almost worthless. In both cases the 
equipment involved was supplied by well known 
multi-national vendors. I include them because they 
demonstrate that when building systems, it is important 
to verify vendor claims about security measures on which 
you rely.
Keys that are not all they seem to be 
There are a number of generally accepted good security 
and control practices covering the use of terminals for 
financial transactions.
1. The user should always be positively identified using a 
combination of user-id and password.
2. Sensitive functions such as system administrator; 
security officer, etc. should be split between different 
people.
3. Encryption should be used either to encrypt a message 
or to generate message authentication codes to ‘lock’ 
the message electronically.
4. Control of encryption keys should be subject to 
stringent control, and ideally the key should be 
split into two halves, each half being controlled by a 
different individual.
One such system was concerned with electronic funds 
transfers with transactions involving sums around 
US$0.5 billion, which are not uncommon. All the normal 
precautions were taken, the organisation was set up to 
allow the separation of sensitive duties between different 
individuals; strong encryption was selected to protect the 
messages being transmitted. The most critical elements 
were even subject to a third party review.
At the heart of the terminal security was control of the 
transactions involving the following: the entering of the 
encryption keys, and the setting up of sensitive functions 
such as system administrator and security officer.
In accordance with the very best security practice, the 
separation of duties and dual control were enforced by 
the use of a physical key in addition to the user-id and 
password. The vendor advised that the key locks (built 
into the keyboard) functioned as electronic switches, 
and that the locks used high security barrels. A number 
of checks were made, which established that removing 
the locks or substituting another keyboard would not 
work, because the operation of the keys sent a signal 
to the processor. All the barrel numbers were known 
and a record maintained of which user had which 
barrel. A system was set up using a trusted locksmith 
whereby duplicate keys could be obtained under special 
circumstances. It appeared that a secure system was in 
place.
Unfortunately the locks were not high security locks; 
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car. Duplicate keys could be obtained by walking into 
any service bar and asking for one to be cut, and this was 
exactly how the weakness was discovered.
When this was discovered, further checks were carried 
out which revealed that the switch mechanism was a 
contact breaker set from a car manufacturer. Inserting 
a thin sliver of plastic (from a coffee cup) between the 
lock barrel and the keyboard opened the points and 
bypassed the lock completely. A security measure at the 
heart of a high value electronic funds transfer system was 
worthless. To my knowledge, nobody took advantage of 
the weakness, and no one else ever discovered it. If it had 
been exploited, there could have been some interesting 
litigation to establish who was liable for any losses.
This example demonstrates the importance of taking 
nothing at face value and checking the substance of 
every claim in detail. The lesson is that just because it is 
encrypted, does not mean it is secure.
My second example concerns an early range of ATM 
machines. Any ATM requires a mechanism for identifying 
the customer and establishing that they are authorised 
to use the ATM. Customers are issued with a plastic 
card which contains a magnetic stripe on the reverse. 
The stripe contains many items of information including 
information to identify the issuing bank, the customer 
account number, and a means of validating the PIN. This 
problem occurred before the days of chip and PIN.
The PIN could be validated in one of two ways: they 
are still called online and offline. In an online system, 
the PIN is entered on the pin-pad by the customer and 
encrypted in the ATM. It is then transmitted to a central 
computer where it is verified. With offline working, the PIN 
entered by the customer is validated in the machine using 
information read from the stripe. This piece of information 
is called the offset. It is not the PIN; it is not even an 
encrypted version of the PIN. It is a number that can be 
combined with the PIN (using a cryptographic algorithm) 
to arrive at a predicted result. The key to this security 
mechanism is the strength of the encryption algorithm.
The vendor of the ATM in question had given 
assurances about the strength of the algorithm, which 
were accepted (it was a very large supplier of ATMs). The 
system was used for several years until one bank wanted 
to resolve a quality problem in the card production 
process. Cards were made on an embossing machine 
that took the information about the card holder from a 
reel of computer tape. The bank was having problems 
with errors that were being recorded in the magnetic 
stripe. The solution adopted was to add a further stage 
to the embossing machine. The additional stage took the 
information being fed to the stripe recorder and compared 
it with what had actually been recorded in the stripe. The 
embossing process required knowledge of the encryption 
method, and this was also required by the checking stage. 
The ATM vendors decline to release this information on 
the basis that it was crucial to the security of the whole 
ATM system and was a closely guarded secret. Their point 
was accepted, and it was decided to go ahead with the 
change, but not to validate the offset. The electronics 
engineers then discovered that the encryption process 
was described in detail in the field engineering manuals 
for the ATM.
These had been released to one set of engineers by 
the ATM manufacturer in the belief that they contained 
no information relating to security. What they actually 
contained was information that could have been used by 
criminals to build a device that would have enabled them 
to find the PIN of any plastic card that came into their 
hands.
The strength of an encryption algorithm is only part 
of the story. Security should not have to rely on the 
algorithm being secret – the best example of this is 
DES, where the algorithm is a published standard. Good 
algorithms have a variable component called the key. 
This must be kept totally secret. One method of attacking 
cryptographic systems is to collect the same information 
in encrypted and unencrypted form and analyse this to 
derive the algorithm and key. The trick is to make the 
amount of data and computing effort so large that it is not 
worth doing. This is called the work factor.
The algorithm in these particular ATMs had a variable 
key that was entered in two parts by two different people. 
The engineers discovered that by using about 15 ATM 
cards three times a week for about three months, they 
would have collected sufficient clear text and cypher text 
to find the encryption keys in use (they already had the 
algorithm from published sources). The algorithm had 
a very low work factor. When confronted with the claim, 
the vendors denied its truth. The solution adopted by 
the bank was to stop the offline PIN verification and rely 
on online verification only. Fortunately, these particular 
ATMs are no longer in use, and the banking industry had a 
lucky escape.
If these weaknesses had been exploited, any system 
based on the ATMs in question would have to have been 
shut down, the systems changed, and new cards issued 
to every customer. The cost would have been measured 
in many millions of dollars. It is also likely that claims 
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regarding unauthorised withdrawals from customers’ 
accounts would have been difficult to refute.
Since these events occurred, much has been learned 
about security, and it is improbable that they could 
happen again. That is not to say that other weaknesses 
are not being implemented in secure commercial systems.
The security of the total system is what 
matters 
Another example concerns early ATM systems and the 
card production process. The problem hinged on the 
differing security requirements of offline and online PIN 
verification systems. The PIN is used to authenticate the 
customer. All authentication schemes can follow one or 




A signature and fingerprint are examples of something 
you are, a password is something you know and a car 
ignition key is something you have. The PIN is ‘something 
you know’, the question is, is the plastic card you put in 
the terminal ‘something you have’? With the exception 
of cards using specialised techniques such as magnetic 
watermarking or high hysteresis, the answer is it 
depended on whether PIN verification was conducted 
online or offline. The information on the back of a card is 
easily read – it consists of three tracks and complies with 
a published standard. Some of it is encrypted and some is 
in clear (unencrypted).
Offline PIN verification
When the PIN is verified in the terminal, it is essential 
to have the correct card and to know the PIN. The PIN 
entered through the keypad is processed together with 
the offset recorded in the magnetic stripe. The stripe is 
part of the encrypted information, and even if it is read, it 
is not meaningful. If a card is lost or stolen, the question 
is whether it can be used. If the card holder has stored 
the PIN with the card, it is simple for a thief to use the 
card. If not, the thief has to obtain the PIN, which is not 
particularly simple – although I described, above, how one 
system made it easy to obtain the PIN. Consider the other 
question; if someone obtains the details of a customer 
and somehow discovers the PIN, it is possible for them to 
manufacture a duplicate card? With offline verification it 
is difficult. A criminal would have to calculate the value of 
the offset and write it in encrypted form in the stripe. In 
such a case the thief must possess not only the account 
details and PIN, but must also possess the actual card. 
However, even this has its vulnerabilities, because a thief 
could steal a card and copy the offset from his or her own 
card and write this into the encrypted track. The thief 
would know the PIN associated with the new offset.
Online PIN verification 
For countries that have not implemented chip and PIN, 
if the PIN is verified online, the account information 
is read from the unencrypted part of the card and 
transmitted with the PIN (entered on the keypad) to a 
central computer where validation takes place. The card 
plays no part in the security process. It is there to save 
the customer the bother of entering account information 
through the keypad. If a criminal knows the PIN and 
account details, it is a simple matter to take any card with 
a stripe and make it into any other. The manufacturer of 
my car gave me a plastic card containing its details for 
the convenience of the garage. I could have made it into 
a credit card or ATM card. Unless the issuer is using other 
specialised techniques, such as magnetic water marking, 
there is nothing that links a particular card to a particular 
account or customer. The card is therefore not ‘something 
you have’.
One bank had originally decided that to maintain 
customer service when communication lines were down, 
they would do offline PIN verification. At the time, it was 
using a third party to manufacture or emboss the cards. 
This involved sending magnetic tapes containing all the 
account details and the PIN to the card manufacturer. The 
tapes were transported using security courier. None of 
the information was encrypted in any way. The original 
system specification called for the information to be split 
over two tapes, so that the PIN and account information 
did not come together until the embossing process. 
Somehow in the building of the system, this was changed 
so that only one tape was used. Since the PIN verification 
was offline, it did not matter too much. As we have seen, 
knowledge of account information and PIN was of little 
use because without the encryption process to generate 
the offset, it is all but impossible to produce a (cloned) 
fraudulent card.
Then one day the bank decided to stop offline 
verification and switch to online. This changed everything. 
The tapes with PINs in clear were suddenly a major 
weakness. With online verification, there was no link 
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between the card and the customer. In this case, 
possession of a copy of one or more embossing tapes 
would provide information to make copies of tens of 
thousands of genuine cards. Since the PIN was known, 
they were simple to use. Each card need only be used 
once, and the account details changed. The criminal is 
under no pressure to use the fraudulent card immediately 
as they are with a stolen card. The customer has the 
card in their possession, so no alarm is raised until the 
customer notices a transaction they did not make. This all 
takes time, and even then, the customer has the difficulty 
in convincing the bank that the transaction was not 
genuine.
There are two lessons from this example. The first 
is that evaluating a key control on the basis of a 
requirements specification alone is not valid. There is no 
guarantee that the final system will contain the control. 
To be certain, it is necessary to test that the system as 
delivered, contains the control. The second is that any 
change may introduce a weakness. Any security and 
control mechanism must be documented to show:
1. Why it is there.
2. What it depends upon for its effectiveness.
3. What other controls in turn depend on it.
When any change is made, it is essential that any control 
mechanisms are reviewed to determine whether the 
changes may make the controls ineffective.
Failure of ‘end-to-end’ security
My final example concerns another national funds transfer 
system used for both high and low value transactions. 
Like all such systems, great attention was paid to security 
with the use of strong encryption, and smart cards to 
control and manage encryption keys (that are divided 
into two parts to require collusion for their compromise). 
Like all such payment systems, it required three people 
to make a payment: one to input the details, a second to 
check and a third to release the payment. A proprietary 
database management system was used, and on the 
face of it everything was secure. Except that it was not! 
The application system used by the banks in the country 
concerned enforced the security rules. Messages sent 
between the banks and the central bank were encrypted. 
The database was held by the central bank, and it could 
only be accessed by the payments system program 
code. On some days in the year, a bank might have a 
very high volume of payments, and so they had a facility 
to input payments some days before they were due to 
be processed. They would be stored on the database as 
‘input’ or ‘checked’, which meant that on the processing 
day the bank had only to release them.
The security measures contained in the payment 
system were very good, but the controls by which 
the database management system knew that it was 
communicating with the payment system were poor. 
It acknowledged only one user, namely the payment 
system, and it sent a password to the central bank to 
authenticate it. The developers building the payment 
system had taken no steps to conceal the password. 
Anyone reading the source code would find the password 
clearly labelled. The password was never changed 
because it would require an amendment to the program. 
What this meant was that if a criminal (or a member 
of staff) knew the password and caused the payment 
system to fail, they could use the internet to obtain access 
the database, enter the password and then be free to 
amend any payment details in storage, and to release the 
payment.
Conclusions to be drawn 
We may not know what weaknesses exist in systems used 
by financial institutions. Indeed, it may be that in some 
country somewhere the same faults described in this article 
are still to be found. I have not seen changes in the way 
systems are built that gives me confidence that we are not 
making the same mistakes. I would go further, given the 
pressures on time and costs and the fragmentation of the 
development processes, I think it quite likely that insecure 
systems are still being implemented. I also think that 
anyone in the legal profession involved in cases concerned 
with financial systems should put every effort into 
analyzing all aspects of such systems and independently 
verifying any claims made about security. It requires a 
particular mindset, some might call it devious, to question 
how security measures fit together and whether there are 
weaknesses at the interfaces. There is one group of people 
who are likely to be doing this now: the criminals.
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